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Introduction 
 
When twelve years ago the Albanian citizens  proclaimed their irreversible break with the 
dictatorship, few were fully aware of the harsh and complex reforms that the country had 
to undergo. The slogan guiding the anti-communist movement, “We want Albania like 
the rest of Europe”, rather than an appreciation of European values, was more indicative 
of a profound disapproval of the previous regime and a firm resolution to carry out 
immediate changes.  
The subsequent steps demonstrated that the Albanian society, though wary to the point of 
distortion brought about by one of the most oppressive dictatorships the world had ever 
known, did finally vote in favor of opening up the country and undertaking market 
reforms, thus proving that it had preserved its inherent European inclination. The 
Albanian society knew how to quickly overcome the initial illusions of the consumption-
era euphoria, and took on the responsibility of coping with all the challenges posed by a 
long, difficult unknown road that lay ahead. 
 
Albania’s admission to Bretton Woods institutions on 15 October 1991 undoubtedly 
constituted an historic milestone at that point. That same year, Albania signed the first 
agreement with the European Commission, paving the way for economic and commercial 
cooperation between the two parties (entered into force 1 January 1992). The leap 
forward was unimaginable. After having been considered for several decades an anti-
market symbol, Albania joined these institutions while still being in a state of confusion 
caused by ideological propaganda about the role of these institutions. Albania approached 
them with no previous experience in competition regulations and instruments and at a 
time when, as a result of the radical transformation going on throughout the country, it 
was gripped by sharp social and historical tensions resuscitated by the regional 
atmosphere. 
 
A retrospective look at the road taken during these years, irrespective of transition costs 
and governing shortcomings , for which Albania still continues to pay for through blatant 
shortages in everyday life, confirms that the democratic alternative and the choice made 
for integration still enjoys the broadest consensus through the whole spectrum of the 
Albanian society. This is not merely an emotional choice. This consensus would have 
been seriously threatened without real growth of income in the national economy. 
Confidence in reforms becomes even more understandable when we see that, largely as 
the result of inflation, the per capita GDP grows even more quickly than the total GDP 
(Fig. 1). 
 
Statistics, however, can not tell the full story.  Many aspects of growth unfold only as 
they develop, and their full efficiency and benefits will be brought into operation many 
years later. What can be resolutely said after 11 years of reforms, is that Albania has 
become an open country unhesitatingly choosing the road towards the market economy. 
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The Albanian people are now conscious that the integration process into the developed 
world is a relationship between benefits and responsabilities 
 
Fig. 1: GDP and GDP per capita growth 
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The macro-economic stability, the satisfactory economic growth, the strengthening of the 
budget income, the increasing sustainability capacity of the economy, the increase of the 
contribution made by the private sector (up to 75%) in the national GDP, the constant 
improvements in law and order, infrastructure, in education and social assistance, are 
rendering the transition results ever more tangible. And perhaps more important than all 
the changes in the quantitative indices of the economy and domestic physical 
infrastructure, are the profound changes that have taken place in peoples’ minds, ensuring 
that social behaviour is developed in line with requirements posed by the reforms and the 
political and social patterns that the country is aspiring to adopt. 
Hence it is conceivable why the news of the European Commission’s mandate to open 
negotiations for a Stabilisation-Association Agreement with Albania was viewed from 
most Albanians neither as a surprise nor as a gift. Most Albanians maintain that this is a 
very important, yet long-deserved decision. In the meantime, there is general 
understanding that the road towards full-fledged membership is still long and difficult.. 
 
1. The First Stage of Stabilisation – Fragile Splendor 
 
Albania entered the last decade of the twentieth century as the poorest country in Europe.  
Although Albanians enjoyed acceptable standards in healthcare and education, a very 
high percentage of the work force (about 62%) was engaged in agriculture, the economy 
was run by extremely orthodox Communist methods,  the population was totally isolated 
from any relations with foreigners, the internal market system was closed, an therefore 
Albania had an unusual level of autarchy which in turn reflected towards a  pronounced 
tendency towards heavy industry and cereal production, a fast growing population and 
work force, and a history of constant interruptions of foreign trade orientation due to 
frequent changes in international political alliances. 
                                                          
2 Calculations are based on official estimates for real GDP, in lekë. 
3 The gap between the two rates, GDP per capita rate and real GDP rate, can be explained by the negative 
change in the population size, as well as by  year-to-year changes in the exchange rates. 
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The lack of political stability and the administrative chaos causing the disintegration of 
the planned economy in 1991-1992 produced a sharp budget deficit, whereas the 
immediate liberalization of prices and collapse in production caused a spike in inflation. 
Hence, by late 1991, the budget deficit was estimated at 44% of the GDP and in the early 
part of 1992, that deficit rose to the tune of 50%.4 The increasing needs for imports on 
one hand and the budget deficit, on the other, were covered either by currency reserves or 
by state loans. The monetary expansion aimed at financing the budget deficit was 
accompanied by inflation, which by May-June 1992 was 10-15% a month. Production, 
and industrial production in particular, was on the decline. During the period under 
discussion industrial production was reduced by 50%.5 (IMF Report 1994). Besides the 
economic recession (for 1992 only, estimates show a decline of 65% in economic 
performance), the crisis was accompanied by instant aggravation of social indicators, 
such as unemployment, social services and general insecurity. 
 
The economic and political reforms were launched at a steady rate after 1992. The first 
non-Communist government (the Democratic Party) was characterised by a resolute 
willingness to carry out these reforms. Given the fact that it enjoyed large popular 
support, it was committed to a programme of radical reforms both in the field of political 
institutions and in the economy. 
This initial phase of transition saw speedy and surprising progress, which won Albania a 
place among the most advanced central and southeastern European countries in terms of 
the rate and the intensity of the reforming process.  
 
Over a three-year period, about 70% of the economy was privatised; prices and trade 
were almost entirely liberalized and tight monetary and fiscal policies led to an admirable 
macroeconomic stability: in 1995, inflation was estimated at only 7% against 231% 
recorded in 1991; in 1995, the budget deficit was 10% of the GDP as compared to about 
50% in 1991; and the floating exchange rate applied in 1992 brought about sufficient 
stability of the domestic currency). 
 
The reaction to these reforms was very quick. The newly emerging private sector proved 
to be highly dynamic, making the greatest contribution to overall economic growth. 
During the period 1993-1996, negative growth rates were recorded in many countries 
under transition, yet Albania experienced an annual average growth rate of 9.5%,  which 
is very high even by East Asian standards. 
As far as Foreign Investment, Albania attracted a modest 130 million USD, (or less than 
$40 per person), but this indicators were comparable to that of many other countries 
undergoing transition.  Meanwhile Albania received large contributions (about $1 billion 
until 1996) from international donors and financial institutions. 
 
Over the arch of a few years, a democratic legal framework was introduced, democratic 
institutions were set up, and a public administration that was much more qualitative and 
                                                          
4 National figures. 
5 Kaminski, Bartlomiej, 2002. Performance, Trade Policies, and Institutions in South Eastern Europe: The 
Case of Albania, mimeo, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 
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efficient than the previous one was created. Albania was quickly admitted as a member of 
international political and financial institutions such as the Council of Europe, the IMF, 
the World Bank, and the EBRD. And its foreign policy was oriented towards integration 
into Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures. 
In the analyses made by foreign experts and institutions during 1994-1996 Albania was 
more often than not referred to as a “special case of successful transition”. 
 
It should be mentioned though, that the transition “cost” was very heavy for the Albanian 
society. Liberalization and privatization led to the shutting down of many state-run 
industries, which in the years 1992-1993 caused unemployment to rise to an estimated 
28.5%, which we believe remains approximate to this day.   Entire social categories such 
as the retired, the unemployed and government officials were left with personal incomes 
that classified them under the poorest groups of society. Poverty was broader in the 
countryside, more severe in towns, and nearly despairing in the backward areas, 
particularly in northern and northeastern Albania. 
 
Although it is not easy to explain, it is worth mentioning the fact that despite the great 
economic hardships, the social and psychological traumas experienced in the course of 
this radical transformation of the past ten years, Albanians have showed great courage in 
coping with the difficulties, revealing such a regenerating force and energy to move 
ahead that should be recognized and respected. 
 
The successful and optimistic picture renders it difficult to provide explanations to one of 
the biggest traumas Albania had to go through: the grave political and social crisis of 
1997. This crisis took even the most skeptical analysts of the post-communist transition 
by surprise. The results of the progress achieved over the first five years of reform 
through difficulties and high social costs disappeared nearly instantaneously. 
The complete and immediate freezing of state institutions, the loss of public order, the 
social anarchy, the acts of violence and the destruction that prevailed in Albania during 
1997 were not accidental results of incidental factors. The causes of the crisis were 
generated by a larger historical context in the development of Albanian society. Certain 
phenomena that emerged during the transition period, however, had a greater impact on 
these causes. 
 
The weakness and fragility of the state institutions, and the public lack of confidence in 
the political institutions, were the most significant expression of the crisis; whereas the 
failure of pyramid investment schemes in which over 50% of the people had invested 
their savings was perceived as the direct cause of this crisis. 
Of course, the cause behind this tragic crisis was not concerned merely, and perhaps not 
chiefly, by economic factors. Neither were the great economic and social transition 
hardships: the natural outcomes of the transforming reforms, nor the big financial losses 
that the population suffered in the pyramid investment schemes, sufficient grounds to 
generate that tragic social unrest. 
We suppose that this was first of all an important warning with regard to the arbitrary and 
irresponsible policies being pursued. 
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2.   Quick recovery of lost time 
 
A characteristic feature of the economic developments in Albania over the transition 
period was the country’s ability to recover quickly, in economic terms. Following a 30% 
decline in outputs in early 1992, in 1993-1996 the GDP grew between 7 and 11% 
annually.  
 
The regenerating capability, however, unfolded clearly following the 1997 crisis. 
Following a 7% decline during 1997, the GDP has grown by  a value of 7-8% annually 
from 1998 to this day. There are certain factors that should be taken into account with 
regard to the Albanian phenomenon of quick recovery, although it is difficult to explain 
(at the same time all southeastern European countries had recessions, or recorded very 
low growth values, - about 2-3%): 
 
? the very low base (initial starting) level 
? the quick macroeconomic liberalisation (end of 1992) 
? the rapid privatisation of farmland, trade and services (during 1993) 
? the obvious capability of the population to adjust to free initiative practices and 
the dynamics of the newly emerging private sector  
? the quick and large-scale immigration towards neighbouring countries - mainly 
Greece and Italy (about 20% of the total population), and high rates of 
remittances, which are thought to reach values of $350-500 million annually 
? considerable foreign aid during these years (approximately $1 billion) 
 
Fig.  Changes in the production structure during  1992-2002 
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The recovering force of the Albanian economy is also seen in the fact that, despite the 
instability caused by the war in neighboring Yugoslavia and Kosovo during which 
Albania shouldered the burden of hosting over 500,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees, again 
the economic growth indicators were almost not affected, and continued the high growth 
rate.6 
 
Tab.  Albanian Foreign Trade 
 
In  million 
USD 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Eksports 111.7 141.4 204.8 243.7 158.6 208 274.4 255.9 304.6 
Imports -601.2 -601 -679.8 -922 -693.5 -811.7 943.0 -1079.3 -1337.5 
Trade 
Deficit -489.5 -459.6 -475 -678.3 -534.9 -603.7 -668.5 -823.4 -1032.9 
 
 
 
3. Sustainable growth? 
 
Can we state that Albania has already succeeded in having sustainable growth, and 
sufficient possibilities to be integrated into the European Union in the near future? 
If we were to proceed from the relative stabilisation of basic indicators of economic 
growth following large fluctuations that went on until 1993, the answer would be 
positive. (Fig 2) 
 
Fig. 2. The dynamics of inflation, deficit and real growth 
 
 
However, a definitive positive answer would be too optimistic and far from reality. 
                                                          
6 Riccardo Faini, 2001. Macroeconomic Stabilisation during the Transition: Albania's Experience in a 
Comparative Perspective, mimeo. Ministerio dell'Economia and CEPR, December. 
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First, the impressive growth of outputs during these years has been more of a “revival” 
than “steadfast growth”. One can talk of “growth” and “steadfastness” when an economy 
has considerable growth in assets and capital products, large investments in technology, 
and a tangible increase in the educational and vocational level of human capital. None of 
the above factors has been achieved in sufficient levels in the Albanian economy. The 
FDI level remains one of the lowest recorded in the transition countries ($160 per capita 
in 2000); agriculture and trade supply the largest share of the GDP (established at 
approximately 50%), whereas industry’s contribution is estimated to hardly reach the 
level of 10% share of GDP. 
It is clear that Albania’s economic performance is supported by domestic capital and 
certain urban sectors. Today’s economy is almost entirely oriented towards imports, and 
foreign deficit is still high (imports exceed exports by five times). Agriculture, which has 
hitherto had the highest growth rates and contributed the largest part to the GDP (Fig. 3), 
is giving signals of slowdown caused by the structural deficiencies due to the very small 
size of farms (1-1.5 hectares) and the fact that land trade is still at a very rudimentary 
stage. Poverty is increasing, and in several parts of the country it matches the levels 
recorded in underdeveloped countries (17.4% of the population is estimated to live in 
complete poverty). 
Albania has a higher polarisation and disparity of society and poverty than all the other 
countries of central and southeastern Europe. In for 1998 the value of the GINI indicator 
was 0.43. Even though the official level of poverty in Albania is very low (an Albanian 
family with less than 6500 lek or 50 Euros a day), about 20% of the population is below 
this level, while one fifth of the population survives with less than 1.2 Euro a day. The 
education level of the population has fallen significantly, and the widespread 
phenomenon of ”brain-drain” has considerably impoverished the quality of human 
capital. 
 
Fig. 3: Albania - Contribution of various sectors to the GDP growth from 1992-2000 
(in per cent)  
 
 
Source: Trade policies and institutions in the SEE countries in the EU Association and Stabilization 
process, World Bank, Regional Report (draft), 2002 
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Currently, the GPRS and the three-year guarantee (+MTF) GPRS, is the first initiative 
launched nationwide for the purpose of achieving a medium-term programme of 
governmental interventions. An analysis of the process of economic transformations 
carried out over a transition decade indicates that this document focusing on the 
comprehensive growth also emphasizes yet untapped economic growth resources. By 
identifying the barriers to economic growth and threats to the country’s macro-economic 
stability, the priority public action plan aims precisely at removing these barriers. 
Another important feature of the GPRS is that it serves as a reference point for devising 
the Government’s medium-term budget programme in compliance with established 
priorities following a comprehensive discussion with all players involved. 
 
 
 
Secondly, properly-functioning market institutions have not yet been established. They 
are either incapable, nonfunctional or corrupted. The weakness or non-existence of 
market regulatory mechanisms, which during the first stage of reforms facilitated and 
promoted the flourishing of small-sized business and the accumulation of starting capital, 
have now become a real obstacle to development. Monopolies, whether open or covert, 
total failure of properly-functioning market supervision mechanisms, the worrying 
proportions of informal economy and crime in particular, constitute large barriers to the 
introduction of FDI and increase in private investments, and distort the price structure 
and reallocation of capital and human resources.  
The energy crisis that has had the country in its iron grip for the past two years and would 
have resulted in a better finale had it lasted for a medium-term period of time, 
compromises severely any expected economic growth. Albanian analysts foresee growth 
rates declining considerably in 2002 (from 6.5% in 2001 to only 4-5%). Macro-economic 
stability, which has been achieved, is still very fragile, while the world economy will 
continue to be exposed to internal and external shocks.  
Unlike other countries in the region, the road infrastructure in Albania is below normal 
standards, and there is much to be done in the fields of electrical energy, 
telecommunications and road interconnections. The country’s financial system resembles 
a banking system. Although about ten private banks are operating in Albania, their role in 
the country’s economy is insignificant (whereas in 2000 the total in saving accounts was 
estimated at 34.8% of the GDP, credit intended for the private sector comprised only 
10.2% of the total of all deposits).7 
 
Setting in motion and strengthening market mechanisms and institutions, thereby 
reducing the informal sector of the economy remain the only strategic challenges for the 
                                                          
7 Bank of Albania, Economic Bulletin, No. 1, 20002 
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time being. Protection of property rights, respect for contractual obligations, strict 
application of the exit mechanisms, normal functioning of market regulatory bodies 
including the anti-trust and anti-dumping mechanisms are ineffective and in an almost 
chaotic state. Financial and technical assistance provided by donors in these directions 
has been focused more on the drafting of laws and the formal setting up of respective 
agencies, rather than the continuation of support towards their strengthening, training and 
supervision, which would be sorely needed. 
 
The weak functioning of the institutional market mechanisms has led to the prevalence of 
a free private economy (similar to anarchy) in the market, which is a far cry from a 
normally functioning market economy. The immediate concern regarding the informal 
sector of the economy, which makes up about 40% of annual output,8 is criminal activity, 
including traffic in human beings and narcotic substances, massive tax evasion, the 
discriminatory (partial) and selective application of custom taxes and duties, and the 
monopolies of inputs (though frequently covert) and internal trade. The biggest threat to 
the internal economy and social development in Albania is the fact that the country may 
find itself in the grip of a low-level reform equilibrium (partial reform), in which case it 
will find it impossible to walk away from this road.9  
 
 
4. Stabilisation-Association process - a guarantee for reforms  
 
The tragic events that affected Albania in 1997 were not the only and last that have 
occurred in the region. They were anticipated by a series of conflicts that developed into 
wars in the process of the dismemberment of former Yugoslavia. New interethnic 
confrontations and tensions erupted even later on, indicating that fragility was a common 
feature for the Balkan countries. It became clear that conflict situations were no longer 
only a latent potential in the inter-regional relations. They have already grown into a real 
threat to investments made hitherto by the donor community, and more importantly, to 
the fate of the initiated reforms. 
Recognising the above, in 1999 the European Commission crafted the Stabilisation and 
Association Process as a new “framework” to ensure progress and safeguard reforms in 
southeastern Europe. In June 2000 this concept was endorsed by the Council in Feira. In 
the Zagreb summit, on 24 November 2000, it met the full approval of all countries in the 
region as well, thus being proclaimed as the principal platform for economic and social 
development until their full admission to the European Union. 
We maintain that the Stabilisation and Association Process is a guarantee of the reforms 
because it is based on: 
The guaranteed perspective of European Union membership, provided that fundamental 
principles and standards affecting the rule of law, consolidated democratic institutions 
and the development of a market economy are accepted and implemented. 
The need for these countries to develop bilateral relations as basis for greater economic 
and political stability in the region. 
                                                          
8 Albania - Stabilisation and Association Report, Brussels SEC (2002) 
9 See for more Transition, the First Ten Years, World Bank, 2002 
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The need for assistance programmes for these countries to serve as political and 
economic perspective, while retaining the appropriate flexibility that allows each country 
to determine its own rates for overcoming the post-conflict situations, and adopting the 
acquis communautaire. 10 
The Stabilisation and Association Process is already beginning to produce desired results. 
The region is becoming more stable. Its countries are engaged in ambitious political and 
economic reform programmes based on EU law and practice. These achievements are set 
out in detail in the attached country reports. 
Another element that makes of the Stabilisation and Association Process a guarantee for 
the democratic future of southeastern Europe is the fact that it is a long-term and dynamic 
process. It is not based on every reforming step, but on a “lasting reform”. As it develops, 
this process gains flexibility and a dynamic character, thus being able to keep abreast of 
developments in the region, in the EU itself and across the world, and react promptly to 
sudden crises. Its access to more efficient instruments in the future, which will help 
tackle chronic problems such as weakness of democratic institutions and rule of law, 
corruption, national extremism, poverty and social exclusion, will make it a real buffer of 
the climate in the region, contributing considerably to regional cooperation and the 
absorption of foreign investments. 
Albania is an active participant in the Stabilisation and Association Process, and is 
demonstrating consistent resolve in the fulfillment of conditions on the path to European 
integration. 
The opening up of negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association agreement with the 
EU, formally declared by the President of the European Commission Mr. Romano Prodi 
during his visit in Tirana on January 31st, is expected to act as a major political and 
psychological encouragement, helping the country channel its efforts into the European 
platform in a more useful way. 
 
 
5.  The donors and the civil society – important factors for minimizing the          
 “development costs” 
 
The planned reforms contained in the government’s agenda, such as privatisation of 
public services and of some strategic companies, the invigoration of the fiscal system and 
of regulatory market mechanisms are in fact an indicator of the pressure exercised and 
requests tabled by donors and non-government factors rather than a serious commitment 
made by government. The bureaucracy of the donor party, on one hand, dictates 
objectives and deadlines to be met, which seem to serve and justify the “progress” and 
“success” of their programmes. On the other hand, the government seems to be lacking in 
appropriate preparation and suitable possibilities for the implementation of those 
programmes.  
Experience has showed that the results have been a formal fulfillment of the objectives, 
or their anticipated implementation, but far from the practical focus of the programmes 
(delays in the privatisation of the Savings Bank or the problematic privatisation of the 
telecommunication and banking sectors in the period 2000-2001 are typical examples). 
                                                          
10 European Commission, Albania - Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006. 
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On the other hand, the Albania-based representatives of certain donors and IFI-s are 
rather looking forward to promoting their performance while not shying away from 
speaking in the media about the “successes” of reforms here. After being tolerated for a 
long period of time by the donors themselves, the conditional criteria are condemned by 
the donors themselves usually when it is too late. 
 
There are of course some movements in the right direction. Donors like World Bank, 
USAID, DIFID or the Dutch Government, especially during the last two years, are 
seriously concerned to optimize the efficiency of their assistance through holding 
preliminary discussions and consultations with various governmental agencies, either 
representatives of the government or local groups, involving in these discussions also the 
non for profit organizations, with regard to the assistance they provide. Most other 
donors, however, are usually content to discuss the assistance programmes with the 
appropriate ministries or the specific agencies assigned by them, which more often than 
not prompts competition among domestic institutions. The conditional criteria and terms 
affecting foreign assistance becomes usually information accessible only by certain 
ministries. Other players, such as the parliament or civil society, learn about them only 
when failure to implement the projects drives the donors into announcing them openly. 
Important donors have developed their own ways to convey the vision, practices and 
procedures of the organisations they run, often causing symptoms of confusion in the 
Albanian administration.   
 
Such situations have led to an unclear or unstable legal framework, and to the adoption of 
institutional patterns, which fail to be compatible with one another, and even less so with 
reality. Not infrequently, reforms are oriented towards contradicting priorities, which 
often reflect the “specific vision” of the various international organisations. The most 
positive impact the Stability Pact is expected to bestow is the promotion of a higher level 
of coordination and harmonisation among the various donor programmes. It was 
precisely at this point that the Stability Pact perhaps failed, giving rise to competition and 
jealousies among the various donor agencies that have been ongoing for the past two 
years. 
 
Failure to have a competent and efficient system intended to monitor and assess 
reforming policies and programmes within the governmental system seems to be a 
significant structural shortcoming of the country. The monitoring groups have been set 
up on a temporary basis, with brief and insufficient training. A parallel and coordinated 
monitoring system, covering all the ministries and principal governmental agencies, 
would ensure an accurate and timely assessment of the achievement of political 
indicators and the efficiency or the misuse of such funds, by making periodic 
arrangements whenever possible, while facilitating and evaluating the impact of foreign 
assistance programmes. It is paradoxical to think that, while the government is 
systematically a target of criticism for failing to meet the objectives of its programmes 
and for misuse of funds, the reports on foreign assistance assessment written by the 
donors’ bureaucracy speaks only of successes, surprising impacts and high efficiency! 
 
 13
The impose of assistance in the form of “tied aid” is another element, which in certain 
cases compromises the image of foreign assistance and considerably reduces its 
efficiency. Varied examples could be cited to this effect, such as the large input of 
technical assistance (foreign counseling) as part of the budget for every programme. This 
kind of assistance is very costly, and of very poor quality. Another example is the 
selection of western companies to be responsible for the implementation of a project, 
which sometimes are not completed in time nor do they have the appropriate desired 
output. Although there is no doubt about the high level of corruption in public 
administration, one finds it impossible not to think that the frequent and excessive 
reference to this corruption by representatives of the international community, in a 
number of cases, serves as an excuse either for the inefficiency of their own programmes 
or corruption in the donor bureaucracy itself. 
 
Activating and invigorating of market mechanisms and institutions and the reduction of 
the informal sector of the economy remain the only strategic challenge for the time being. 
The protection of property rights and respect for contractual obligations, strict application 
of exit mechanisms, standard functioning of market regulatory bodies and anti-trust and 
anti-dumping mechanisms are ineffective and in an almost chaotic state. The donors’ 
financial and technical assistance provided hitherto in these directions has rather been 
focused on the drafting of laws and formal setting up of the respective agencies, whereas 
what would be needed was to continue support for their strengthening, training and 
supervision. 
Finally, we have “macro-economic informality”. To what extent are the figures on the 
GDP guaranteed? Often our statistics cannot calculate the GDP, or the “direct” method 
provides decidedly different figures because of “cooked” balance-sheets submitted by 
companies and enterprises, or their absence altogether from the informal business. 
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